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RACIAL GERRYMANDERING, THE FOR THE 
PEOPLE ACT, AND BRNOVICH:  SYSTEMIC 
RACISM AND VOTING RIGHTS IN 2021 
Joseph Palandrani* and Danika Watson** 
INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Supreme Court held racial gerrymandering unconstitutional in 
1960 in Gomillion v. Lightfoot,1 striking down the bizarrely redrawn 
congressional boundaries of the City of Tuskegee, Alabama:  a twenty-eight-
sided figure that removed virtually all Black voters from within the city limits 
and placed them outside the city limits—without removing a single white 
voter.2  Nevertheless, as states across the country redraw legislative district 
lines that disenfranchise minorities and perpetuate systemic racism, the legal 
doctrine protecting against racial discrimination in gerrymandering remains 
fraught.  In the spring of 2021, minority voting power is both championed 
and attacked in Congress and in the Supreme Court of the United States.  The 
For the People Act of 2021,3 passed by the House of Representatives in early 
March 2021, promises to restore the strength of the Voting Rights Act of 
19654 by expressly banning partisan gerrymandering.5  If passed, the For the 
People Act would provide the first federal statutory cause of action for voters 
to bring claims challenging partisan gerrymandering.  Meanwhile, at the 
Court, Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee6 raises challenges to § 2 
of the Voting Rights Act,7 a tool historically used to challenge racially 
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 1. 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
 2. Id. at 341. 
 3. H.R. 1, 117th Cong. (2021). 
 4. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 and 
52 U.S.C.) 
 5. H.R. 1, 117th Cong. § 2403(b). 
 6. No. 19-1257 (U.S. argued Mar. 2, 2021). 
 7. 52 U.S.C. § 10301.  This Comment uses “Voting Rights Act” to refer to the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965. 
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discriminatory redistricting, by threatening its ability to protect minority 
voting power and potentially legitimizing highly restrictive election laws that 
disproportionately impact marginalized Black, Indigenous, and other people 
of color (BIPOC) communities. 
In the spring of 2021, minority voting rights are at stake.  This Comment 
begins with Part I, a brief primer on the current state of U.S. legal doctrine 
around race, redistricting, and representation that precipitated the For the 
People Act (particularly the sections that comprise the Redistricting Reform 
Act8) and that are implicated in Brnovich.  Then, Part II.A explains the 
imaginary line between partisan and racial gerrymandering that the For the 
People Act seeks to eradicate.  State legislatures and redistricting 
commissions draw district lines with significant racialized impact under the 
banner of “partisan gerrymandering,” which the Supreme Court upheld as 
constitutional on nonjusticiability grounds under the political question 
doctrine in 2019 in Rucho v. Common Cause.9  Under the guise of a 
permissible partisan purpose, these district lines deprive minority citizens of 
equal voting power, perpetuating and entrenching racial power imbalances.   
Part II.B introduces § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, the provision challenged 
in Brnovich.  This Part then presents historical successes in challenging and 
deterring racial gerrymandering using § 2.  It proceeds to outline § 2’s 
weaknesses in protecting minority voting strength and combating minority 
voter suppression after the Supreme Court struck down its sister provision—
§ 5—in 2013 in Shelby County v. Holder.10 
Part III outlines several of the current “open questions” on minority voting 
power and redistricting raised by Brnovich and the Redistricting Reform Act 
of 2021.  First, this Part charts the relationship between Brnovich—a Voting 
Rights Act vote denial case—and redistricting, which gives rise to Voting 
Rights Act vote dilution claims.  This Part shows that the Court may use 
Brnovich to limit the reach of its vote dilution precedents, thereby potentially 
weakening § 2 of the Voting Rights Act.  Next, this Part outlines the 
important features of the Redistricting Reform Act, which passed the House 
in March 2021 as part of the For the People Act.  With detailed mechanisms 
for restricting partisan gamesmanship in congressional districting and strong 
remedial provisions, the Act shows a promising way out of entrenched, 
nonjusticiable disenfranchisement. 
I.  UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND HAPPENING ALL THE TIME 
Racial gerrymandering has been unconstitutional since the Supreme 
Court’s Gomillion decision in 1960.11  Yet even today, states redistrict in 
ways that dilute minority voting power and entrench systemic racism, while 
 
 8. H.R. 1, 117th Cong. §§ 2400–2435. 
 9. 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019). 
 10. 570 U.S. 529 (2013). 
 11. Id. at 347–48. 
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the broader legal doctrine around gerrymandering, race, and representation 
is pervasively unsettled.12 
Racial gerrymandering is unconstitutional.13  But it still happens.14  In 
2019, the Court reinforced the constitutionality of “political” gerrymandering 
in Rucho,15 preserving an easy defense for racial gerrymandering by allowing 
legislatures to redistrict in ways that dilute the voting power of racial 
minorities in the many districts across the nation where race and political 
party affiliation are closely tied, if the legislature justifies redistricting on 
political affiliation grounds.16 
A.  Redistricting 
States redraw their congressional and state legislative district maps every 
ten years after the U.S. Census provides new population demographic data.17  
 
 12. See Girardeau A. Spann, Gerrymandering Justiciability, 108 GEO. L.J. 981, 1009 
(2020) (“In a time of increasing cultural diversity in the United States—a time when whites 
will soon cease to constitute a numerical majority of the population—the Court appears to 
have gerrymandered the law of justiciability in a way that facilitates the efforts of whites to 
preserve the current advantage they have over racial minorities in the domain of electoral 
politics.”); Emily K. Dalessio, Note, Say the Magic Words:  Establishing a Historically 
Informed Standard to Prevent Partisanship from Shielding Racial Gerrymanders from 
Federal Judicial Review, 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1907, 1954–55 (2020) (“Had the Rucho 
Court started with a presumption of racial gerrymandering, this evidence would likely have 
been sufficient for the Court to uphold that presumption, even in the face of the State’s 
evidence that the map was governed by race-neutral partisan districting principles.  Thus, 
under this test the 2016 map would have been subject to the strict racial gerrymandering 
analysis . . . rather than being dismissed as a political question.”); Kyle Keraga, Note, Drawing 
the Line:  A First Amendment Framework for Partisan Gerrymandering in the Wake of Rucho 
v. Common Cause, 79 MD. L. REV. 798, 799–800 (2020) (“Rucho . . . declared that partisan 
gerrymandering is a nonjusticiable political question . . . despite a longstanding 
acknowledgement that extreme gerrymandering is ‘incompatible with [our] democratic 
principles’—over the years, assorted Justices from both parties have criticized 
gerrymandering as everything from ‘cherry-pick[ing] voters,’ to ‘rigging elections,’ to a 
subversion of ‘the core principle of republican government . . . that the voters should choose 
their representatives, not the other way around.’”)\. 
 13. See Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 347–48 (holding that a racial gerrymander affecting Black 
voters violated the Due Process and Equal Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, as 
well as the right to vote in the Fifteenth Amendment). 
 14. See Michael Li, The Redistricting Landscape, 2021–22, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 
(Feb. 11, 2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/redistricting-
landscape-2021-22 [https://perma.cc/89XB-XNGV] (detailing current and ongoing risks for 
gerrymandering and unfair map drawing); Press Release, Brennan Ctr. for Just., 2021–22 
Redistricting Cycle Poses High Risk of Racial Discrimination in the South, New Projections 
Show (Feb. 8, 2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/2021-22-
redistricting-cycle-poses-high-risk-racial-discrimination-south [https://perma.cc/3XRX-
W9TC] [hereinafter Brennan Ctr. Press Release] (identifying redistricting risk factors and 
locations currently prone to racial gerrymandering). 
 15. 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2488–89 (2019). 
 16. See Sara Tofighbakhsh, Note, Racial Gerrymandering After Rucho v. Common 
Cause:  Untangling Race and Party, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1885, 1900–01 (2020) 
(demonstrating the inextricable intertwining between race and party). 
 17. Who Draws the Maps?:  Legislative and Congressional Redistricting, BRENNAN CTR. 
FOR JUST. (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/who-
draws-maps-legislative-and-congressional-redistricting [https://perma.cc/27RV-JXQX] 
(surveying all fifty states’ approaches to redistricting). 
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Historically, each state determines who designs the district maps, resulting 
in a wide variety of districting authorities that includes:  state legislatures, 
which may propose districts through regular legislation; advisory 
commissions that consist of legislators or nonlegislators who recommend 
redistricting plans to the legislature; independent commissions; political 
appointee commissions; political commissions consisting entirely of 
incumbent lawmakers; backup commissions that draw maps in cases of 
legislative deadlock or a governor’s veto; and single district states that have 
only one congressional district.18  When districts are drawn such that their 
voting populations tilt in favor of one party and gain or retain one party’s 
political power, these districts are “gerrymandered.”19 
B.  Gerrymandering 
The portmanteau term “gerrymandering” arose in 1812 after 
Massachusetts governor Elbridge Gerry drew salamander-shaped state 
legislative districts that favored Democratic-Republicans over Federalists.20  
Over the ensuing two hundred years, gerrymandering’s strategically wriggly 
district-drawing has become a critical feature of the political apparatus, 
allowing those who control the redistricting processes to secure political 
power that goes far beyond pure proportional representation to exceed their 
numerical voting strength.21 
How are gerrymandered districts drawn?  The “[t]wo common forms of 
contemporary gerrymandering are:  (1) partisan gerrymandering that seeks to 
secure electoral advantages for one’s preferred political party, and (2) racial 
gerrymandering that seeks to secure electoral advantages for one’s preferred 
race.”22  Both partisan and racial gerrymandering strategies give voters in 
some districts a stronger voice than voters in others, raising serious 
constitutional controversy on questions of vote dilution that strain the 
principle of democratic self-governance and the principle of “one person, one 
vote.”23  Critically, both partisan and racial gerrymandering have a 
disproportionate impact on the voting strength of racial minorities:  
purportedly partisan gerrymanders substantially affect voters who are 
minorities.24  Moreover, gerrymandering is just one component of a program 
 
 18. See id. 
 19. See Michael Wines, What Is Gerrymandering?  And How Does It Work?, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/27/us/what-is-gerrymandering.html 
[https://perma.cc/PV64-M4DP] (explaining the mechanics of gerrymandering in the weeks 
after the Rucho decision). 
 20. See Spann, supra note 12, at 984. 
 21. See id. 
 22. See id. at 984–85. 
 23. See id.; see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565–67 (1964) (outlining the “one 
person, one vote” principle under the Equal Protection doctrine). 
 24. See, e.g., China Dickerson, To Attack Systemic Racism at the Root, Look to the State 
House, THE HILL (Aug. 21, 2020, 8:30 AM), https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-
blog/politics/513054-to-attack-systemic-racism-at-the-root-look-to-the-state-house 
[https://perma.cc/VEH2-2495] (“[S]ome of the most powerful drivers of structural racism in 
America . . . includ[e] voter suppression and partisan gerrymandering.”).  See generally Kim 
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of voter suppression driven primarily by state legislatures that 
disproportionately impacts voters of color and also includes restrictions and 
barriers like voter identification laws, voter purges, aggressive pushes to 
close polls in communities of color, and felon disenfranchisement.25 
C.  Redistricting in 2021 
Redistricting’s pressing questions arose yet again this year, not just 
because of the controversies surrounding the 2020 federal election and the 
2020 Census leading to redistricting,26 but also because of two critical 
movements in the legislature and judiciary.  The For the People Act, passed 
by the House of Representatives in early March 2021, includes the 
Redistricting Reform Act which promises to restore the strength of the 
Voting Rights Act by expressly banning partisan gerrymandering.  If passed, 
the For the People Act would establish the first federal statutory cause of 
action for voters to bring claims challenging their district lines.  Meanwhile, 
Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee27 calls into question § 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act—the tool historically used to challenge racially 
discriminatory redistricting—by potentially jeopardizing the section’s 
validity while undermining its protections of minority voting power and may 
legitimize highly restrictive election laws that disproportionately impact 
marginalized BIPOC communities. 
 
Soffen, How Racial Gerrymandering Deprives Black People of Political Power, WASH. POST 
(June 9, 2016, 12:01 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/06/09/ 
how-a-widespread-practice-to-politically-empower-african-americans-might-actually-harm-
them/ [https://perma.cc/67ND-KTP6]; Olga Pierce & Kate Rabinowitz, ‘Partisan’ 
Gerrymandering Is Still About Race, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 9, 2017, 6:48 PM), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/partisan-gerrymandering-is-still-about-race 
[https://perma.cc/6ZGV-DX2B]. 
 25. See, e.g., Ankita Rao et al., Is America a Democracy?  If So, Why Does It Deny 
Millions the Vote?, GUARDIAN (Nov. 7, 2019, 6:01 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2019/nov/07/is-america-a-democracy-if-so-why-does-it-deny-millions-the-vote 
[https://perma.cc/EJZ2-P964] (“Legislators across the country have tightened the 
requirements for acceptable forms of identification—this in a country where 7% of Americans 
do not have photo IDs, and the number is higher among black and Hispanic populations.  In 
2016, Wisconsin reinstated strict voter ID laws, ostensibly to fight voter fraud, which experts 
have repeatedly found to be almost non-existent.”). 
 26. See, e.g., Reid J. Epstein & Nick Corasaniti, The Gerrymander Battles Loom, as 
G.O.P. Looks to Press Its Advantage, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/31/us/politics/gerrymander-census-democrats-
republicans.html [https://perma.cc/2A8K-6NK7] (“While partisan warfare on Capitol Hill 
draws most of the national attention, the battles over redistricting are among the fiercest and 
most consequential in American government.  Reapportionment and redistricting occurs every 
10 years after the census . . . .  The balance of power established by gerrymandering can give 
either party an edge that lasts through several election cycles; court challenges—even if 
successful—can take years to unwind those advantages.”); David A. Lieb, Redistricting Power 
at Stake in 2020 Legislative Elections, AP NEWS (Jan. 11, 2020), 
https://apnews.com/article/db1ad1c1d335599b579f90262ee0e537 [https://perma.cc/2YT3-
FJUG] (“‘We’ve got the next 10 years of politics at stake in these elections,’ said Patrick 
Rodenbush, communications director for the National Democratic Redistricting 
Committee.”). 
 27. No. 19-1257 (U.S. argued Mar. 2, 2021). 
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As discussed later in Part III, these principles underlie the key “open 
questions” on minority voting power and redistricting raised by the 
Redistricting Reform Act and Brnovich.  These questions concern the 
relationship between redistricting and vote dilution under the Voting Rights 
Act, the road ahead for redistricting reform that insists on independent 
redistricting commissions and rejects both racial and partisan 
gerrymandering, and the artificial distinction between them. 
II.  RACE, REDISTRICTING, AND REPRESENTATION 
This Part presents a brief primer on the current state of U.S. legal doctrine 
surrounding race, redistricting, and representation that precipitated the For 
the People Act and that are implicated in Brnovich.  Redistricting 
commissions continue to draw lines with significant racial impact under the 
banner of “partisan gerrymandering,” which the Court held to be 
constitutional on nonjusticiable political question grounds in Rucho.28  These 
purportedly partisan lines deprive minority citizens of equal voting power 
and of voting’s expressive and associative functions, perpetuating and 
entrenching racial power imbalances.  Finally, this Part describes the 
questions of race, redistricting, and representation raised in the Redistricting 
Reform Act of 2021 and Brnovich. 
A.  Why Do We Need Redistricting Reform? 
The Redistricting Reform Act of 2021, one component of the For the 
People Act sweeping electoral reform package,29 proposes a fundamental 
overhaul of the states’ approaches to redistricting by implementing clear 
national standards.  Its proposals include both mandating the use of 
independent redistricting commissions and prohibiting the use of any map 
that discriminates against minorities or that unduly favors or disfavors a 
political party.30  These reforms directly confront the Court’s 2019 ruling in 
Rucho, which held that, unlike racial gerrymandering claims, partisan 
gerrymandering claims are outside a federal court’s jurisdiction because they 
present nonjusticiable political questions.31  Rucho establishes that 
redistricting bodies can create voting districts with the predominant intent of 
achieving a particular political composition.32  While overtly racial 
gerrymanders drawn predominantly on lines of race had already been held 
 
 28. 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2498–99 (2019). 
 29. See G. Michael Parsons, The Peril and Promise of Redistricting Reform in H.R.1, 
HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Feb. 2, 2021), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/the-peril-and-promise-
of-redistricting-reform-in-h-r-1/ [https://perma.cc/JX7W-9ZE2]. 
 30. See Ronald Brownstein, The GOP Cheat Code to Winning Back the House:  The 
Stakes for Democrats’ Election-Reform Plan Couldn’t be Higher, ATLANTIC (Feb. 11, 2021), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2021/02/democrats-need-hr-1-and-new-vra-
protect-party/617987/ [https://perma.cc/SP7D-89JW] (evaluating H.R. 1’s redistricting 
provisions and highlighting the partisan gerrymander prohibition’s connections to election 
reform trends in state law). 
 31. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2506. 
 32. Id. at 2506–07. 
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both justiciable and unconstitutional,33 Rucho has created an impenetrable 
thicket that complicates analyzing redistricting cases for districts in which 
racial identity and political affiliation are closely intertwined.34 
B.  Rucho’s Defense of Partisan Gerrymandering 
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, writing for the five Republican-appointed 
Justices of the Supreme Court forming the majority in Rucho, rejected the 
Court’s ability to review a partisan gerrymandering claim because such 
claims present “political questions beyond the reach of the federal courts,”35 
which “have no commission to allocate political power and influence in the 
absence of a constitutional directive or legal standards to guide [them] in the 
exercise of such authority.”36  In other words, Rucho construes partisan 
gerrymandering as nonjusticiable because of the lack of workable standards 
to guide the courts.37 
C.  Rucho’s Imaginary Line Between Racial and Partisan Gerrymandering 
The position that the Court adopted in Rucho in 2019 had previously been 
widely criticized for drawing an impracticable and arguably artificial bright 
line between partisan gerrymandering and racial gerrymandering.38  Where 
racial identity and party affiliation are closely intertwined, Rucho forces 
federal courts to make logically impossible determinations about whether 
race or party drives the gerrymander.39  As Professor Girardeau A. Spann has 
written, the Rucho decision on justiciability doctrines in gerrymandering 
“protects the political power of white voters” by “allowing white 
Republicans to dilute the political power of minority Democrats.”40  Spann 
notes that the Court clearly acknowledged the strong correlation between 
 
 33. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 644–45 (1993); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 
U.S. 339, 347–48 (1960). 
 34. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2495–96. 
 35. Id. at 2506–07. 
 36. Id. at 2508. 
 37. See id. 
 38. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Racial Gerrymandering’s Questionable Revival, 67 ALA. 
L. REV. 365, 381 (2015) (“The intersection of race and party makes the search for a 
predominant motive impossible.”). 
 39. See Richard L. Hasen, Opinion, The Gerrymandering Decision Drags the Supreme 
Court Further into the Mud, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/27/opinion/gerrymandering-rucho-supreme-court.html 
[https://perma.cc/3XEW-2CT6]; Meaghan Winter, Opinion, Want to Dismantle Structural 
Racism in the US?  Help Fight Gerrymandering, GUARDIAN (Aug. 21, 2020, 6:27 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/aug/21/gerrymandering-republicans-us-
election-structural-racism [https://perma.cc/2LBJ-QX4Z] (“The US supreme court [sic] has 
prohibited explicit racial gerrymanders but has declined to ban gerrymanders that effectively 
achieve the same outcome.”). 
 40. See Spann, supra note 12, at 982–84 (arguing that “whites will derive a net benefit 
from treating racial gerrymanders as justiciable.  And by gerrymandering the line that 
separates justiciable from nonjusticiable claims, the Supreme Court will have succeeded in 
helping whites to preserve the political advantage that they have over racial minorities.”). 
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race and political affiliation in Department of Commerce v. New York.41  
There, the Court rejected the Trump administration’s proposal to add a 
citizenship question to the 2020 Census, holding that the administration’s 
self-proclaimed interest in compliance with the Voting Rights Act was 
“contrived” and “pretextual” and that the administration poorly concealed its 
true, underlying motivation to use the citizenship question to facilitate 
electoral redistricting.42  The analysis in Department of Commerce indicates 
that the Court recognizes the close entanglement between race and partisan 
political affiliation in the electoral districting context.43 
Yet in Rucho the Court found no such entanglement, drawing an illusory 
bright line between political and racial gerrymandering on the very same day 
that it handed down Department of Commerce.44  Yet, like in the 2020 
Census case, the Court in Rucho reviewed evidence suggesting an insidious 
racial motivation:  the district court decision had revealed that the primary 
mapmaker, tasked by the state legislature to remedy an earlier redistricting 
that had been determined to be an unconstitutional racial gerrymander, was 
explicitly instructed by Republican state legislators to use granular political 
data to “‘change as few’ of the district lines . . . as possible in remedying the 
racial gerrymander.”45  Moreover, the mapmaker created detailed maps that 
“tracked race, voting patterns and addresses of tens of thousands of North 
Carolina college students” and drew a congressional district line that divided 
North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University—the largest 
historically Black college in the nation—“so precisely that it all but 
guarantees it will be represented in Congress by two Republicans for years 
to come.”46 
 
 41. 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019). 
 42. See id. at 2575–76. 
 43. See id.; see also Spann, supra note 12, at 995–96 (noting that “[t]he correlation 
between race and political affiliation is particularly strong in the electoral context, as 
evidenced . . . in Department of Commerce,” and further noting that “[p]ress coverage 
indicated that, although the stated reason for adding the question was to facilitate enforcement 
of the Voting Rights Act, the real reason was to facilitate the drawing of election districts that 
would enhance the voting strength of white Republicans by reducing the voting strength of 
Latinx residents who were likely to support Democratic candidates” (citing Tara Bahrampour, 
GOP Strategist and Census Official Discussed Citizenship Question, New Documents Filed 
by Lawyers Suggest, WASH. POST (June 16, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-
va/2019/06/15/new-documents-suggest-direct-connection-between-republican-redistricting-
strategist-census-bureau-official-over-citizenship-question/?utm_term=.fb19ad03c406 
[https://perma.cc/M8SS-CFL2] (writing that expert map strategist and advisor Thomas 
“Hofeller had also done a study in 2015 that concluded a citizenship question on the census 
would result in a structural electoral advantage for Republicans and non-Hispanic whites.”)) . 
 44. See generally Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019); Dep’t of Com., 139 
S. Ct. 2551 (2019). 
 45. See Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777, 805 (M.D.N.C. 2018). 
 46. See Dalessio, supra note 12, at 1954 (citation omitted); see also id. at 1954–55 (“Had 
the Rucho Court started with a presumption of racial gerrymandering, this evidence would 
likely have been sufficient for the Court to uphold that presumption, even in the face of the 
State’s evidence that the map was governed by race-neutral partisan districting principles.  
Thus, under this test the 2016 map would have been subject to the strict racial gerrymandering 
analysis . . . rather than being dismissed as a political question.” (citations omitted)). 
132 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 89 
The Rucho problem of distinguishing race from political party arises in an 
era of hyper-partisanship amplified in the districting process by highly 
sophisticated software and demographic data tools that enable districts to be 
drawn with exacting precision for anyone seeking a political advantage— 
whether racial, partisan, or both.47  Precision redistricting, a multimillion-
dollar enterprise driven by advanced mapmaking software and terabytes of 
voting data, escalates the level of demographic knowledge and control that 
redistricting authorities may exert during the redistricting process.48 
With sitting lawmakers and other partisan affiliates drawing maps in many 
states and powerful incentives to tilt the playing field toward maintaining and 
expanding incumbents’ political reach,49 the majority’s position in Rucho 
further limits the judiciary’s ability to intervene in the next wave of 
gerrymanders that have the potential to further diminish voting power for 
racial minorities.  This strengthens the defense of partisanship even in those 
cases where district lines trace racial demographics and diminish minority 
voting power.50  The Brennan Center for Justice identified the 2021–2022 
redistricting round as likely to be particularly detrimental to communities of 
color, particularly in the South where historic features like single-party 
control of the redistricting process and weaker legal protections for 
communities of color meet new challenges of fast population growth and 
demographic change.51 
In the face of these challenges, several states have implemented 
redistricting reform measures that may inform the aims and successes of the 
proposed federal plan; examples include the independent commissions 
introduced in Michigan and Colorado that will draw both congressional and 
legislative maps independent of the state legislatures, advisory commissions 
in New York and Utah, and a bipartisan commission introduced in Virginia.52  
These successes of state legislative action signal the possibility of broader 
reform that can target the hyper-partisanship shaping the redistricting process 
which perpetuates systemic racism through vote dilution and entrenchment.  
As outlined in Part III, the relationship between vote dilution claims and 
redistricting under the Voting Rights Act is currently being challenged at the 
 
 47. See generally Rebecca Green, Redistricting Transparency, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1787 (2018) (surveying technological approaches and innovations impacting redistricting); 
Spann, supra note 12. 
 48. See Vann R. Newkirk II, How Redistricting Became a Technological Arms Race:  
Advances in Data, Computing, and Fundraising Have Given Politicians New Power to 
Gerrymander Democracy Away, ATLANTIC (Oct. 28, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/10/gerrymandering-technology-redmap-
2020/543888/ [https://perma.cc/Z6LQ-RAVH] (“Redistricting is the great game of modern 
politics, and the arms race for the next decade’s maps promises to be the most extensive—and 
most expensive—of all time.”). 
 49. See Who Draws the Maps?:  Legislative and Congressional Redistricting, supra note 
17 (surveying all fifty states’ redistricting authorities). 
 50. See Brennan Ctr. Press Release, supra note 14 (demonstrating how the upcoming 
redistricting round is “likely to be the most challenging in recent history and particularly 
detrimental to communities of color.”). 
 51. See id. 
 52. See id. 
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Supreme Court and is expected to probe the connection between redistricting 
and other electoral administration measures and procedures that 
disproportionately impact the voting rights of communities of color while 
also threatening the tenuous status of the Voting Rights Act.  Meanwhile, as 
discussed in Part IV, the For the People Act amplifies the successes of several 
state-level electoral reforms and moves toward a future electoral process that 
circumvents Rucho’s unworkable divide between race and politics:  the For 
the People Act would create the first federal statutory cause of action for 
political gerrymandering and mandate independent redistricting 
commissions for each state’s redistricting body. 
III.  BRNOVICH V. DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE 
This term, the Supreme Court, in Brnovich v. Democratic National 
Committee, is considering whether two Arizona voting statutes violate the 
Voting Rights Act.  One of the challenged Arizona laws invalidates any ballot 
cast at a polling location outside the voter’s assigned election precinct.53  The 
other law prohibits volunteers from collecting ballots from voters’ homes to 
deliver them to election authorities for counting.54  Minority voters’ ballots 
are invalidated under the out-of-precinct rule at double the rate of white 
voters’ ballots, and the policy “has disenfranchised over 38,000 Arizonans 
since 2008.”55  Similarly, the ballot collection ban disproportionately impacts 
Black, Latinx, and Indigenous voters, who often lack reliable transportation 
and mail services and who are, for those reasons and others, more likely than 
white voters to submit their ballots with the assistance of volunteer ballot 
collectors.56 
The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc in 2020, found that both of Arizona’s 
voting restrictions violated § 2 of the Voting Rights Act.57  Section 2(a) of 
the Voting Rights Act prohibits state and local governments from enacting 
election-related rules or policies that result in “a denial or abridgement of the 
right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.”58  
Section 2(b) gives shape to this proscription by defining impermissible rules 
as those which give voters of one racial group “less opportunity than other 
 
 53. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-122 (LexisNexis 2021) (“No person shall be permitted to 
vote unless such person’s name appears as a qualified elector in both the general county 
register and in the precinct register . . . .”); id. § 16-584(C) (permitting voting by provisional 
ballot where a voter’s name does not appear in a precinct’s voter register only if the voter’s 
“residence address [is] within the precinct in which the voter is attempting to vote”). 
 54. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-1005(H) (“A person who knowingly collects voted or 
unvoted early ballots from another person is guilty of a class 6 felony.”).  Voters’ ballots may, 
however, be collected by such voters’ mail carriers, election officials, family members, 
household members, or caregivers. See id. §§ 16-1005(H), 16-1005(I).  
 55. Brief for Respondents at 2, Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm. (U.S. argued Mar. 
2, 2021) (No. 19-1257), 2021 WL 242302 [hereinafter DNC Brief]. 
 56. See Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Hobbs, 948 F.3d 989, 1005–07 (9th Cir. 2020) (en 
banc), cert. granted sub nom. Ariz. Republican Party v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 
221 (2020) (mem.) and cert. granted sub nom. Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. 
Ct. 222 (2020) (mem.). 
 57. See. Hobbs, 948 F.3d at 1032, 1037. 
 58. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a). 
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members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect 
representatives of their choice.”59  Alleged violations of this provision of § 2 
are assessed based on “the totality of circumstances.”60  In the Ninth Circuit’s 
analysis, governments violate § 2 when:  (1) their election rules impose a 
“disparate burden on members of the protected class” and (2) there is a 
“legally significant relationship between the disparate burden on minority 
voters and the social and historical conditions affecting them.”61  Because 
the disparate impacts of Arizona’s voting restrictions are attributable to “the 
social and historical conditions affecting”62 Arizona’s minority citizens—
including, for example, the state’s history of discriminatory voting 
practices63 and the effects of past and present discrimination on current 
health, educational disparities, and economic disparities64—Arizona’s 
restrictions failed the Ninth Circuit’s § 2 test.65 
Arizona successfully petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari 
to review the Ninth Circuit’s decision.66  Arizona insists that facially neutral 
election laws only violate § 2 if they:  (1) result in a “substantial disparate 
impact” on minority citizens’ opportunity to vote67 and (2) directly cause 
disproportionate outcomes such that “the substantial disparate impact arises 
from ‘the state’s actions rather than those of other persons.’”68  If the Ninth 
Circuit’s construction of the Voting Rights Act were sanctioned, Arizona 
contends that the Voting Rights Act may exceed Congress’s power under the 
Reconstruction Amendments69 (as limited by City of Boerne v. Flores70) and 
run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause.71 
While the election restrictions challenged in Brnovich are unrelated to 
districting, the reach of the Court’s districting jurisprudence is at stake in 
Brnovich.  This is because the Ninth Circuit’s analysis relied on a leading 
Voting Rights Act districting case:  Thornburg v. Gingles.72  Challenges to 
 
 59. Id. § 10301(b). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Hobbs, 948 F.3d at 1012. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See id. at 1017–26, 1034. 
 64. See id. at 1027–28, 1034. 
 65. See id. at 1032, 1037. 
 66. See Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 222 (2020) (mem.). 
 67. Brief for State Petitioners at 19, Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm. (U.S. argued 
Mar. 2, 2021) (No. 19-1257), 2020 WL 7121776 [hereinafter Arizona Brief]. 
 68. Id. at 24 (quoting Luft v. Evers, 963 F.3d 665, 672 (7th Cir. 2020)). 
 69. See id. at 25–26 (arguing that § 2 of the Voting Rights Act is unconstitutional if it 
“invalidates facially neutral laws like Arizona’s without evidence of a substantial disparate 
impact” because such a proscription would impermissibly expand the right to vote as 
guaranteed by the Fifteenth Amendment). 
 70. 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (holding that Congress cannot “make a substantive change” 
in the constitutional rights it seeks to protect when it enacts remedial legislation pursuant to 
the Reconstruction Amendments). 
 71. Arizona Brief, supra note 67, at 26–27 (arguing that the Ninth Circuit’s exacting test 
would compel state legislators to enact “overwhelmingly race conscious” voting laws in 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause). 
 72. 478 U.S. 30 (1986); see Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Hobbs, 948 F.3d 989, 1011–14, 
1016 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (using Gingles to frame the court’s analysis), cert. granted sub 
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discriminatory redistricting under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act—such as the 
one sustained in Gingles—allege that minority citizens’ votes are diluted;73 
by contrast, Arizonans’ votes are not merely diluted but denied if cast in 
violation of the contested policies.74  The courts have historically had more 
occasion to address claims of vote dilution than claims of outright vote 
denial, in part because voting schemes that threatened to disproportionately 
deny minorities their votes were often rejected by the federal government 
before they could take effect pursuant to the Voting Rights Act’s since-
invalidated preclearance mechanism.75  For this reason, and because § 2 of 
the Voting Rights Act nowhere indicates that different standards ought to be 
used to assess vote dilution and vote denial claims,76 the Ninth Circuit looked 
to Gingles to guide its evaluation of Arizona’s voting laws.77  The two-part 
test adopted by the Ninth Circuit78 derives from Gingles, and Gingles 
provides the salient questions a court must ask to make effective use of that 
test—including a list of nine context-specific factors enumerated in the 
Senate Report accompanying the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights 
Act.79  Among other things, those factors include “the extent to which 
members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision bear the 
effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health,” 
“whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle 
racial appeals,” and “whether the policy underlying the . . . voting 
[regulations] is tenuous.”80 
The parties in Brnovich vigorously contest whether the Gingles test is 
appropriate in vote denial cases.81  Arizona even insinuates that the Court 
 
nom. Ariz. Republican Party v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 221 (2020) (mem.), and 
cert. granted sub nom. Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 222 (2020) (mem.). 
 73. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 46–51 (explaining the relationship of districting to 
impermissible vote dilution). 
 74. See Hobbs, 948 F.3d at 1012 (“The case now before us involves two vote-denial 
claims.”). 
 75. See id. (explaining that “[t]he jurisprudence of vote-denial claims is relatively 
underdeveloped in comparison to vote-dilution claims” because the effectiveness of the 
Voting Rights Act’s preclearance system had reduced the need for civil litigants to enforce 
vote denial claims until the Court declared the preclearance system unconstitutional in Shelby 
County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013)); see also Brief of the NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. 
Fund, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 16, Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l 
Comm. (U.S. argued Mar. 2, 2021) (No. 19-1257), 2021 WL 276500 (“Without the 
preclearance requirement, Section 2 is the primary tool for combating racial discrimination in 
access to the political process.”). 
 76. See generally 52 U.S.C. § 10301. 
 77. See Hobbs, 948 F.3d at 1012–13 (citing Gingles to define the appropriate “results test” 
to apply to vote denial claims). 
 78. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 79. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 36–37 (1986) (citing S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 
28–29 (1982)); Hobbs, 948 F.3d at 1012–13 (first citing Gingles, 478 U.S. at 36–37; then 
citing S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28–29). 
 80. Hobbs, 948 F.3d at 1013. 
 81. Compare DNC Brief, supra note 55, at 32–33 (arguing that § 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act requires the same analysis in vote dilution and vote denial claims), with Arizona Brief, 
supra note 67, at 32–33 (arguing that the Court’s framework for analyzing vote dilution claims 
is inapposite in vote denial cases). 
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should abandon Gingles entirely.82  But Brnovich demonstrates the dangers 
of sequestering Gingles’s context-focused analysis in the Court’s § 2 
jurisprudence in favor of the strict and formalistic test Arizona presses.83  For 
example, using the Gingles analysis, the Ninth Circuit noted that the 
campaign in support of Arizona’s ballot collection prohibition was supported 
by a racially inflammatory campaign video that baselessly suggested that a 
Latino ballot collector engaged in voter fraud.84  While this is a damning fact 
under Gingles, which invites courts to ask “whether political campaigns have 
been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals,”85 there is no room for 
it in Arizona’s narrow inquiry.  Moreover, Gingles’s admonition to consider 
“whether the policy underlying the . . . voting [regulations] is tenuous”86 
encourages judicial skepticism of pretextual justifications for voting 
restrictions that impose racially disparate burdens.  The Ninth Circuit 
demonstrated the power of this component of the Gingles test:  picking 
through Arizona’s dubious election-integrity rationales for its ballot 
collection policy, the court noted that “if some Arizonans today distrust third-
party ballot collection, it is because of the fraudulent campaign mounted by 
proponents” of the law.87  But some of the Justices of the Supreme Court 
appear far more credulous of Arizona’s proffered justifications:  at oral 
argument, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Gorsuch referred to ballot 
collection as ballot “harvesting”88—a “loaded term” adopted by opponents 
of the practice89—and pointed to a report that purportedly supported 
restrictions on third-party ballot collection.90  If Gingles’s rigorous 
“tenuousness” inquiry were relaxed or jettisoned in the manner suggested by 
the Justices’ comments and urged by Arizona, the federal courts could lose a 
powerful check on discriminatory state voting laws. 
 
 82. Arizona alleges Gingles has a “myopic focus on legislative history,” Arizona Brief, 
supra note 67, at 33, indicative of a “bygone era of statutory construction.” Id. (quoting Food 
Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2364 (2019)). 
 83. See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text (describing Arizona’s reading of § 2). 
 84. See Hobbs, 948 F.3d at 1009–10, 1028–29. 
 85. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 37 (1986) (quoting S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28–29 
(1982)). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Hobbs, 948 F.3d at 1037. 
 88. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 65–67, 96, Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm. 
(U.S. argued Mar. 2, 2021) (No. 19-1257) [hereinafter Brnovich Transcript] (Chief Justice 
Roberts’s references to ballot “harvesting”); id. at 57, 83–84 (Justice Gorsuch’s references to 
the same). 
 89. Amber Phillips, What Is Ballot ‘Harvesting,’ and Why Is Trump So Against It?, WASH. 
POST (May 26, 2020, 3:55 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/05/26/what-
is-ballot-harvesting-why-is-trump-so-against-it/ [https://perma.cc/PA63-GLMN] (“Election 
experts say ‘harvesting’ is a loaded term . . . .”). 
 90. See Brnovich Transcript, supra note 88, at 65, 67–68 (Chief Justice Roberts’s 
references to the report); id. at 83 (Justice Gorsuch’s references to the same); see also id. at 
88, 112 (Justice Kavanaugh’s references to the same). 
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Finally, in a colloquy with Justice Kagan, counsel for the Arizona 
Republican Party91 suggested that under his context-insensitive 
interpretation of the Voting Rights Act, a state or local government could 
lawfully cancel early voting on Sundays—even if evidence showed that 
Black citizens vote on Sundays at ten times the rate of white citizens.92  While 
Justice Kagan posed this scenario as a hypothetical, its implications are real 
and concrete:  just this year, Georgia Republicans considered restricting early 
voting on Sundays as a means to suppress Black voter turnout.93 
When faced with a racially discriminatory districting scheme, the Gingles 
Court interpreted § 2 of the Voting Rights Act to require a searching, fact-
intensive inquiry to assess disparate-impact claims.  If Arizona persuades 
today’s Court to limit Gingles’s analysis to vote dilution cases, § 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act, which has grown in importance since Shelby County, 
could be weakened considerably. 
IV.  THE FOR THE PEOPLE ACT OF 2021 
While there is cause for concern about the future of voting rights in the 
federal courts, there is some cause for hope that Congress will step in to 
strengthen the franchise.  The Rucho Court, in emphasizing that Congress 
could remedy the wrongs the Court declined to address, observed that “[t]he 
first bill introduced in the 116th Congress would require States to create 15-
member independent commissions”94; a version of that legislation has now 
passed the House of Representatives.95  The bill—a piece of the For the 
People Act titled the Redistricting Reform Act of 2021—would require 
independent state commissions to make congressional redistricting 
 
 91. The Arizona Republican Party filed a separate petition for writ of certiorari, which the 
Court granted and consolidated with Brnovich. See Ariz. Republican Party v. Democratic Nat’l 
Comm., 141 S. Ct. 221 (2020) (mem.). 
 92. See Brnovich Transcript, supra note 88, at 24–25. 
 93. See Nick Corasaniti & Jim Rutenberg, In Georgia, Republicans Take Aim at Role of 
Black Churches in Elections, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/06/us/politics/churches-black-voters-georgia.html 
[https://perma.cc/NF7T-LJ4W] (describing the historical relationship between church-
affiliated early voting on Sundays and Black political mobilization and explaining how a bill 
that passed the Georgia House of Representatives in March 2021 would limit such voting). 
But see Nick Corasaniti, Georgia G.O.P. Passes Major Law to Limit Voting Amid Nationwide 
Push, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/25/us/politics/georgia-
voting-law-republicans.html [https://perma.cc/HX6D-XA3K] (reporting that the version of 
the Georgia bill that ultimately became law, while deeply restrictive, does not include 
restrictions on Sunday voting).  For the text of the restrictive law Georgia recently enacted, 
see Election Integrity Act, 2021 Ga. Code Ann. Adv. Legis. Serv. 9 (LexisNexis).  For a 
thorough contextual analysis of the Georgia law’s most consequential provisions, see Nick 
Corasaniti & Reid J. Epstein, What Georgia’s Voting Law Really Does, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 
2021, 2:51 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/02/us/politics/georgia-voting-law-
annotated.html [https://perma.cc/X49T-DKNA]. 
 94. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2508 (2019). 
 95. See Nicholas Fandos, Targeting State Restrictions, House Passes Landmark Voting 
Rights Expansion, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/03/us/politics/house-voting-rights-bill.html 
[https://perma.cc/MR85-DH89].  See generally H.R. 1, 117th Cong. §§ 2400–2435 (2021). 
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decisions.96  These commissions would be convened in part by “Nonpartisan 
Agenc[ies]” established within each state’s legislature.97  Such agencies 
would choose the first six members of each commission;98 those six members 
would in turn appoint nine more99 for a total of fifteen members per 
commission.100  Any registered voter who has not changed parties within 
three years,101 has no immediate familial political ties,102 and has not violated 
federal election law103 may apply to be on a state commission.104 
The Redistricting Reform Act is a meticulously detailed piece of 
legislation.  It prescribes standards for each commission’s day-to-day 
operations,105 sets deadlines for the selection of commission members,106 
and lays out the procedures by which the commission is to engage the public 
in the districting process.107  But its broad provisions are likely its most 
significant.  The bill requires, for example, that districts “respect 
communities of interest, neighborhoods, and political subdivisions”108 and 
deems district lines unlawful if, under the “totality of circumstances,” it is 
evident that they “unduly favor[] or disfavor[] a political party.”109  
Reiterating the protections of the Voting Rights Act, the Redistricting 
Reform Act would require each congressional district to “provide racial, 
ethnic, and language minorities with an equal opportunity to participate in 
the political process and to elect candidates of choice.”110  And these 
statutory guarantees are backed by a strong remedial framework:  private 
rights of action would be available to anyone “aggrieved” by failures to 
adhere to the bill’s requirement,111 and such actions would be heard by three-
judge panels112 whose decisions would be directly appealable to the Supreme 
Court on an expedited basis.113 
As racially discriminatory voting policies have taken cover behind the thin 
veil of professed partisan motivation, the Court has declined to take remedial 
action.  Meanwhile, precedents like Gingles that could equip courts to 
grapple with the racial impacts of facially neutral but effectively unequal 
election rules are embattled.  With the Voting Rights Act and the Equal 
Protection Clause less likely to adequately safeguard minority voters, further 
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legislation is necessary to fill the void.  By joining the Voting Rights Act’s 
protections for minority voting power with new restrictions on parties’ 
opportunities to tilt the playing field in their favor, the Redistricting Reform 
Act provides a promising response to the enduring racism that infects 
American election law. 
